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Promising Monsters:
Pregnant Bodies, Artistic Subjectivity,
and Maternal Imagination
ROSEMARY BETTERTON
This paper engages with theories of the monstrous maternal in feminist philosophy 
to explore how examples of visual art practice by Susan Hiller, Marc Quinn, Alison 
Lapper, Tracey Emin, and Cindy Sherman disrupt maternal ideals in visual culture 
through differently imagined body schema. By examining instances of the pregnant 
body represented in relation to maternal subjectivity, disability, abortion, and 
“prosthetic” pregnancy, it asks whether the “monstrous” can offer different kinds 
of fi gurations of the maternal that acknowledge the agency and potential power of 
the pregnant subject.
1733 on 10 November with Maryken, wife of the servant to 
the orphanage. A son. But had a face like an ape. At the back 
of the neck an opening as big as a hand. Its genitals were also 
not as they should be. She had seen apes dancing. It did not 
live long. Oh Lord, save us from such monsters.
—Catherina Schrader
The category of the “other” includes the inhabitants of the 
realm of supernatural beings and monsters, the territories of real 
and imagined enemies, and the lands of the dead—places far 
from the centre of the world, where one’s own land is, and one’s 
own reality. The other is always distant as well as different, 
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and against this difference the characteristics of self and society
are formed and clarifi ed.
—Susan Hiller
Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, 
and body fl uids change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. 
Within the body, growing as a graft, indomitable, there is an 
other. And no one is present within that simultaneously 
dual and alien space to signify what is going on. 
“It happens, but I’m not there.” “I cannot realise it, 
but it goes on.” Motherhood’s impossible syllogism.
—Julia Kristeva
In the introduction to her book The Myth of Primitivism, artist and anthropolo-
gist Susan Hiller defi nes the “other” as those things against which we defi ne 
ourselves. But what if that otherness is enclosed in our bodies, as yet unknown, 
neither friend nor enemy, growing inside our own fl esh and blood? Such
monstrous imaginings are the stuff of fairy tales and horror fi lms, and yet, an 
ontological awareness of the body’s alienation from itself and an emergent new 
relationship with an unfamiliar being is familiar to many pregnant women, as 
Julia Kristeva’s powerful description suggests.1 For if the “other” is unknowable 
and monstrous, it can also be intimate and indeed connected to what makes 
us most anxious about our bodily selves, disturbing our own sense of reality. It 
is perhaps, therefore, not surprising that the trope of the monstrous has had 
close connections with pregnancy as the one of the most embodied, and least 
rational, of experiences.2 In our own biomedical times, miscarriages and birth 
malformations are routinely ascribed to maternal ill health or genetics, but to 
our early modern forebears, “monstrous” births were products of a powerful 
maternal imagination, as the words of eighteenth-century Friesian midwife 
Catherina Schrader reveal.
In this essay, I argue that pregnancy continues to be haunted by monsters 
in the Western visual imagination. Following the connection that Kristeva 
made between the maternal body and abjection in Powers of Horror (1982), the 
monstrous maternal has been extensively explored as a fi gure of horror within 
science-fi ction cinema. Barbara Creed identifi ed the birthing monster in the 
Alien series as the “archaic mother” whose alien materiality threatens to engulf 
human subjects (Creed 1993).3 Within the mass media, the “celebrity body” of 
pregnancy is now widely visible (Tyler 2001), while, at the same time, anxieties 
about artifi cial technologies of conception and birth have emerged as central 
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tropes in science-fi ction writing and cinema. Less attention has been paid to 
the ways in which the monstrous maternal body has been represented in other 
aspects of visual culture. By focusing on the work of visual artists who address 
themes of maternal subjectivity, disability, abortion, and “prosthetic” pregnancy, 
I want to open up the question of whether different kinds of aesthetics of the 
maternal body might be discovered in contemporary art. Working with the 
concept of the monstrous that feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti articulates 
in relation to images of the pregnant body which are represented as divided or 
incomplete yet insistently embodied, I ask whether the divided or incomplete 
bodies can represent instances of what Braidotti calls a “materialist theory of 
becoming” (Braidotti 2002, 2). How do these artworks negotiate the relations 
between the socially constituted maternal body and the particularities of the 
embodied materiality of pregnancy?4 If the pregnant body exceeds regulatory 
social norms in certain respects, how are these processes of regulation and 
excess articulated in visual images, and in what ways? And, how do women 
artists explore the split between self and other as productive pregnant subjects? 
Contemporary art, I shall suggest, can explore the monstrous through an imagi-
native reworking of maternal abjection in concrete practices that engage with 
the embodied and imagined agency of maternal subjects.
I begin by putting Braidotti’s theory of the monstrous into dialogue with an 
artwork by Susan Hiller. Braidotti uses, among others, the fi gure of the preg-
nant and birthing subject to explore a differently imagined set of relationships 
between self and other.5 My reading of Hiller’s work Ten Months (1977–79), sug-
gests that this radical possibility was anticipated in an early example of feminist 
art practice that also posed questions about the identity of the pregnant subject 
within the creative process.
Maternal Imagination
In her essay “Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt: On Teratology and Embod-
ied Differences” (1996), Braidotti analyses what structures Western cultural 
discomfort with the pregnant body. She notes the origins of the term teratos in 
its double sense in Greek as that which is both prodigy and demon, evoking fas-
cination and horror and, as such, structurally ambiguous. In this way, Braidotti 
argues, the monstrous helps organize structures of difference in a same/other 
binary between what is sacred and mutant, normal and abnormal, whether it 
be between sexual, racial, or human/nonhuman categories. In the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, popular and medical belief made frequent links 
between monstrosity and childbirth: “Monsters are linked to the female body 
in scientifi c discourse through the question of biological reproduction. Theories 
of the conception of monsters are at times extreme versions of the deep-seated 
anxiety that surrounds the issue of women’s maternal power of procreation in a 
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patriarchal society” (139). Monstrous births could be linked to women’s sexual 
excess or perversion, the mixing of different sperm or between different races, 
intercourse during menstruation, eating forbidden food, or demonic posses-
sion—and in a modern twist to the theme, to toxic or genetic damage. The 
maternal imagination was deemed to have the power to kill or deform the fetus 
merely through an act of illicit looking: “She had seen apes dancing.”6 Women 
in their maternal function, therefore, had to be disciplined to control their 
desires for the well being of the unborn child—a regulatory model that persists 
in contemporary injunctions on pregnant women not to smoke, drink, or take 
drugs. According to this model, the pregnant woman, like the monster, is split 
with contradiction: “The female, pregnant body is posited both as a protective 
fi lter and as a conductor or highly sensitive conveyor of impressions, shocks 
and emotions. It is both a ‘neural’ and somewhat ‘electrical’ body. There is an 
insidious assimilation of the pregnant woman to an unstable, potentially sick 
subject, vulnerable to uncontrollable emotions” (149).
But Braidotti does not see the monstrous as wholly negative. Following 
Donna Haraway (1992), she discusses “the promises of monsters,” the monster 
as a productive process: “I would like to propose a re-defi nition, the monster is 
a process without a stable object. It makes knowledge happen by circulating, 
sometimes as the irrational non-object.” (Braidotti 1996, 150). In her recent 
book, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (2002), Braidotti 
develops this argument further, stating her central question as “how to repre-
sent mutations, changes and transformations, rather than Being in its classical 
modes,” and her central aim as fi nding new fi gurations of hybrids and monsters 
as possible models for a “materialist theory of becoming” (2).
I argue here that works of art, like other imaginative practices, can explore 
the tensions that pregnant bodies evoke through their “mutations, changes 
and transformations,” and thus offer “new fi gurations” rather than theoretical 
closure. A different set of intertwined questions concerns the power of the 
maternal imagination and how it might be deployed in thinking about the 
pregnant woman who is simultaneously a creative subject and object. One 
artwork that addresses the problematic of the pregnant body as a material pro-
cess of becoming is Hiller’s photographic installation, Ten Months (1977–79), a 
piece made after her fi rst and only pregnancy (Figure 1). It is based on written 
journal entries and photographs taken during the duration of her pregnancy 
“as a record of the internal and external changes of that period. As someone 
who was already a mature artist [I was] aware of the metaphors of creativity that
come out of pregnancy” (Hiller 1996, 47–48). The work is in the form of ten 
horizontal rectangular panels that follow the ten lunar months of pregnancy, 
each unit made up of a typed text and twenty-eight black and white photographs 
taken each day of her pregnant belly, “the section of the body you couldn’t talk 
about, the pregnant part” (49). At fi rst sight, the installation appears to be an 
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abstract minimalist sequence and its complexity only emerges in conjunction 
with the written texts that accompany it. Visually, the repeated swelling curves 
resemble lunar landscapes that refer indexically to the body’s changing shape 
and ontologically to the pregnant artist as subject. The problematic that the 
work addresses is the dichotomy between the pregnant embodied subject and 
the artist as creative subject, as the accompanying text makes clear:
TWO/ She must have wanted this, this predicament, these con-
tradictions. She believes physical conception must be ‘enabled’
by will or desire, like any other creative process. (Pregnant with
thought. Brainchild. Giving birth to an idea.)
Hiller plays on the traditional metaphor of creativity in which the (male) artist 
claims to conceive and give birth to imaginative ideas, but as a woman artist 
this metaphor has become literally embodied as a paradox. What is the rela-
tion between the artistic subject—the “she” who must have wanted this, who 
wills and desires—and “the irrational non-object” of pregnancy that circulates 
through the images? Hiller exposes the contradiction that the metaphor of male 
Figure 1. Susan Hiller, Ten Months (1977–79) 10 photographs and texts (detail).
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creativity conceals, that actual conception and pregnancy are bodily conditions
that cannot be “enabled” by will or desire and, in this sense, are quite unlike 
the practices involved in making art. Her struggle to resolve this contradiction 
fi nally produces a splitting in the subject:
TEN/Ten Months
“seeing” (& depicting) . . . natural ‘fact’ (photos)
“feeling”(& describing) . . . cultural artifact (texts)
Split between “seeing” and “feeling,” “fact” and “artifact,” the artist as maker 
of the photos and writer of the texts reproduces the doubling of the pregnant 
subject and her ontological uncertainty in a way that mirrors Kristeva’s descrip-
tion of the maternal body as “motherhood’s impossible syllogism.” But Hiller also
articulates this division in the way that the fi rst-person speech of the creative 
subject is enacted in the written text (description) against the belly fragments 
as objects of visual representation (depiction). In giving voice as the pregnant 
subject, she separates her “self” in the text from “the section of the body you 
couldn’t talk about,” which is located in the objective visible realm. The “preg-
nant part” is further confi ned within a minimalist grid, which imposes order 
through formal sequence and repetition. But, as the panels progress through 
the ten months, the curve of the belly swells until it presses against the edge 
of the photographs. Its distended volume suggests an autonomous growth that 
can be barely contained within the rectangular frames, like monstrous swell-
ings or cells multiplying, as indeed they are during pregnancy.7 The embodied 
pregnant woman, like the monster, thus destabilizes the concept of the singu-
lar self, threatening to spill over the boundaries of the unifi ed subject. What 
emerges in Ten Months is the complex fi guration of relations between the 
artist as creative self and embodied other, which is played out in an aesthetic 
of embodied becoming rather than familiar closure in birth. Here, the pregnant 
belly threatens to exceed the rational framework of the work, disrupting the 
binary categories through which the “clean and proper” self is held apart from 
abjection (Kristeva 1982, 8).
Braidotti’s “materialist theory of becoming” opens up a way of thinking 
through the complexity of the embodied pregnant subject as process. Hiller’s 
Ten Months explores the specifi c spatiality and temporality of pregnancy from 
the perspective of the embodied productive subject. Both theory and practice 
pose questions about the contested relationship between the discursive con-
struction of the maternal body within cultural and historical contexts and the 
particularity of individual embodied experience. In the next section, I extend 
these questions further by exploring the representation and self-representation 
of a disabled maternal subject, artist Alison Lapper.8 Can representations of the 
disabled pregnant body destabilize conventional aesthetic ideals, on the one 
hand, and expectations of the maternal body, on the other?
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The Disabled Maternal Body
British artist Marc Quinn’s portrait of Alison Lapper (8 Months) (2000), repre-
sents the artist in late pregnancy and naked (Figure 2). Sculpted in white crystal-
line marble, the statue draws on the ideal of physical beauty defi ned by classical 
Greek sculpture but, in choosing to represent a heavily pregnant woman with 
severe limb disabilities, Quinn challenges aesthetic preconceptions based on 
bodily integrity and physical perfection. He invites us to consider whether a 
bodily ideal that is readily accepted in the limbless and fragmented classical 
statues in the British Museum can be recognized in a “real life” fi gure, “using the 
weight of tradition to undermine itself” (Quinn quoted in Tate Liverpool 2002, 
unpaginated). This point was evidently lost on the London Evening Standard
in its response to the news that the Lapper statue, to be enlarged to 4.7 meters 
high, has been chosen in competition to occupy the famous fourth plinth in 
London’s Trafalgar Square. The headline read: “So, Is This Really What We 
Want on Trafalgar Square’s Empty Plinth?” (quoted in The Independent, 17 
March 2004). In his choice of sitter and medium, Quinn refutes such questions 
and tries, in his words, to use “beauty to conquer prejudice” by drawing on clas-
sical sculptural traditions (Quinn quoted in Tate Liverpool 2002, unpaginated). 
The medium of white marble is associated with memorial art and thus to use 
it to represent a living disabled pregnant woman is already an act of aesthetic 
subversion. The exquisitely modeled face and body, the classical pose of the 
head and torso, and the elevated position of the fi gure on a plinth combine to 
challenge conventional understanding of disability. Lapper, who collaborated 
with Quinn as model, saw the sculpture as a signifi cant statement on her behalf: 
“I regard it as a modern tribute to femininity, disability and motherhood. It is 
so rare to see disability in everyday life—let alone naked, pregnant and proud.” 
(Lapper quoted in London).
Indeed, Quinn’s work addresses signifi cant questions about the nature of 
responses to the sight of pregnancy and disability and, implicitly, about the 
rights of women with disabilities to bear children. But, does this subversion of 
bodily norms free disabled women from a confi ning aesthetic? I offer a more 
ambivalent reading here.
Quinn celebrates Lapper’s physical embodiment using the conventions of 
classical sculpture, but the medium of white marble with a translucent and 
refl ective surface works simultaneously to fi x and to dematerialize her identity 
as a pregnant subject. In their dialogue on the disabled body, Janet Price and 
Margrit Shildrick suggest that in order to guarantee the autonomy of the sub-
ject, “the body must appear invulnerable, predictable and consistent in form and 
function, above all free from the possibility of disruption” (1998, 232, emphasis 
added). The choice of marble has the effect of stabilizing the potentially disrup-
tive fi gure of the disabled pregnant mother, whose embodiment is immobilized 
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in memorial form. Rather than “becoming,” as in Hiller’s work, the temporality 
of pregnancy appears here suspended at a fi xed moment in time. My reading 
is informed by viewing the sculpture in the empty “white cube” of the gallery 
in a solo exhibition of Quinn’s work in 2002, which in turn raises questions 
about the context for any reading of an artwork that are beyond the scope of 
this paper. The crowded urban setting of Trafalgar Square may more precisely 
invoke the vulnerability, unpredictability, and inconsistency of the fi gure as a 
Figure 2. Marc Quinn, Alison Lapper (8 months) (2000).
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public monument.9 But this prompts a further question about Lapper’s identity 
as a professional artist. In assuming the elevated status of monumental art does 
Lapper’s position as a materially situated individual agent become obscured?
When Quinn’s sculpture was fi rst shown, Lapper’s self-identity as a practicing 
artist was not widely known. In a conversation recorded in the Tate Liverpool 
exhibition catalogue, Quinn accepted an analogy “between the hidden process 
going on in the artist’s mind and the hidden process going on inside the mother’s 
womb” (Tate Liverpool 2002, unpaginated). In a double move, his assumed 
correspondence between the conscious creative process of the artist and the 
unconscious process in the maternal womb effaces Lapper’s artistic autonomy 
and denies her agency as a maternal subject. This effacement of the female artist 
as creative and maternal subject is a common trope in traditional art criticism, 
but it is one also reinscribed in Julia Kristeva’s essay on avant-garde aesthetics, 
“Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini” (1980). While for Kristeva the 
maternal is a privileged realm, it remains split between the semiotic and the 
symbolic and the agency of the mother is erased: “It happens but I’m not there,” 
“I cannot realise it, but it goes on” (Kristeva 1980, 237). As Michelle Boulous 
Walker comments in her discussion of Kristeva’s writing, “The maternal is a 
metaphorical site that precludes reference to women” (Boulous Walker 1998, 3). 
In place of the mother, “the artist speaks from a place where she is not, where 
she knows not” (Kristeva 1980, 242), and, in this move, “the productive subject 
silences woman’s (maternal) body by setting itself in her place” (Boulous Walker 
1998, 116).10 But Lapper resists her silencing as an artist and, indeed, uses her 
visibility in Quinn’s sculpture to launch her own work. “The sculpture provided 
a platform for my work. But hopefully it is being exhibited on its own merits 
because it has taken a long time to achieve some acceptance that images of a 
naked disabled woman can be considered as art” (quoted in The Independent, 
14 May 2004).
Lapper’s photographs, including a series of thirteen self-portraits that took 
their inspiration from the Venus de Milo, have been shown in a number of 
venues in the United Kingdom. In an exhibition of her work entitled Vital at 
Nottingham Castle Museum and Art Gallery, she showed a series of images 
based on herself and her infant son, Parys, that adopt imaginary and fantastic 
scenarios described thus: “Shimmering through water you may see images of 
fl ying, fl oating fi gures, perhaps a winged Venus, or the mermaid and her child.” 
Lapper makes images that question perceived ideas of disability and, by drawing 
on myth and fairy tale, creates alternative visions of herself and Parys as marvels 
and monsters. In contrast to the stasis and monumentality of Quinn’s sculptural 
portrait, her body fl oats and spins through the air as though it were released 
from gravity. In Angel, Lapper’s naked torso, a single wing replacing her absent 
arms, projects forcefully into a dark void edged with pink and red fl ower shapes 
(Figure 3). Here, the maternal imagination has powers to summon up fantasies 
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of fl ight that both acknowledge and transcend an insistently embodied reality. 
In a video transcript, she says:
Why do I use myself? That’s a good point. My body isn’t this ugly 
that I had always assumed it was because I’d been told it was.
Even in society today you still do it. You are disabled so there-
fore you are ugly. So now, I think, I almost throw myself at the 
public, . . . then say, well actually, look again. . . . I don’t feel ugly 
and I forget that people get quite shocked by my nudity and by 
what I’m doing, but then great . . . if that’s had an impact . . . 
good. (Intermedia)
Through her work, Lapper insists on her own material reality in order to chal-
lenge aesthetic perceptions of what is deemed beautiful and ugly in the human 
body. She rejects the label ‘disabled mother’ and, in a demonstration of the 
power of maternal imagination to create monsters, she gives birth to images 
of herself and her child in an imaginative process of transformation. In Angel, 
the fi gure of the alien is a means through which to imagine maternal bodies in 
ways that open up morphologies of embodiment to “mutations, changes and 
transformations” (Braidotti 2002, 2). And, by asserting her presence as both a 
Figure 3. Alison Lapper, Angel (1999).
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mother and an artist who has a physical disability, Lapper disrupts the bound-
aries that confi ne disabled and maternal bodies to the nonproductive sphere. 
In so doing, I argue, she destabilizes aesthetic ideals of the maternal body and 
interrogates social norms of motherhood. In the next section, I pursue these 
ideas further in a consideration of the British artist Tracey Emin and her work 
on the maternal body in relation to termination and loss.
Tracey Emin makes multiple references to her own pregnancies and termi-
nations in her work. She frequently uses images, objects, and materials from 
her life to address such dangerous subjects for women as female desire, sexual 
acts, and abortion, consciously mobilizing her life story as a set of narratives 
and performances. She produces her own life as a series of texts in deliberately 
unrefi ned autobiographical form that has the effect of an unmediated intimacy 
in relation to herself and her sexual experiences. The artfulness of Emin’s work 
is in the way she reworks and represents these experiences through a range 
of different aesthetic strategies that assert her agency as an artist. As Mandy 
Merck and Chris Townsend suggest (2002, 7), this is done through “a recur-
rent strategy of repetition and difference, that informs self-representation.” In 
this sense, Emin’s work is the purposeful reconstruction of the past as a set 
of stories and images, rather than the truth of a life. Repeatedly through her 
artwork and performances, she brings “Tracey Emin” into being as an artistic 
identity whose self-exposure is her trademark. One of the strongest aspects of 
Emin’s work is the way in which it speaks with eloquence of the place where 
she was materially situated as a young woman, literally in the southern English 
seaside town of Margate, but also, by extension, in a particular pathologized 
representation of working-class femininity and sexuality, the fi gure of the “slag.” 
Rather than attempting to distance herself from this identity, Emin defi antly 
embraces it. Through her work, she territorializes her own body as the signifi er 
of “Mad Tracey from Margate,” who operates as a permitted transgressive fi gure 
within the conventions of the art world. Emin’s insistent registration of herself 
as the text of her work is often misread as a direct expression of identity, but the 
complex and often indirect ways in which she represents her experiences imply 
a more complex set of mediations between her life and her art.11
Like Lapper, Emin’s deployment of her own body is strategic and she too 
works with the difference and connection between the ideal and the real, the 
beautiful and the ugly. As Jennifer Doyle (2002, 102) suggests, this is particularly 
the case where she employs a “bad-sex aesthetic” to explore experiences that 
can be exhilarating, pleasurable, or abject. For example, the monoprint Ter-
rebly Wrong (1999), shows the artist’s naked body arched back with legs apart, 
expelling “an abortive squiggly pile of blood, shit or semen” (Doyle 2002, 114) 
(Figure 4). The female body is rendered with crude forceful strokes and seen 
from a foreshortened frontal view that emphasizes its vulnerability. Its isolated 
placing on the blank page below the wobbly uncertain script, “Terrebly Wrong” 
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(in reverse) and “SOMETHING’S WRONG,” has an effect that both touches 
and distances. The technique of monoprint—drawing an image directly onto 
the plate, which is then reversed in the printing process—conveys both the 
immediacy of the direct trace of Emin’s hand and articulates a sense of oth-
erness, of that which is familiar having become strange. The intimacy and 
distance effected by the technical process mirrors the immediacy and time lag 
involved in its production. It is, as Doyle suggests, both “a story that is completely
scripted and absolutely personal” (2002, 109).
Whether or not this is a literal representation of a termination, it returns us 
to Braidotti’s fi guration of the monstrous, in which “sexual excess, especially in 
the woman, is always a factor” (1996, 140). Emin’s sexual excess is fi gured here 
and elsewhere in her work, for example, in her installation My Bed (1998), which 
recreates the littered detritus of a night’s drinking and sexual encounter as a
site of abjection. While the critical reception of her work usually focuses on the
artist’s sexuality, I suggest that abjection can be more specifi cally situated in the
loss that it repeatedly reenacts. Both of these works point to Emin’s experiences 
of termination and her mourning for her “dead children” in a series of repeti-
tions.12 The gendered trauma of termination “leaves the subject with nothing to 
show for it,” and this sense of a missing presence is insistently registered from the
Figure 4. Tracey Emin, Terrebly wrong (1997).
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viewpoint of a failed maternal subject (Corby 2004, unpaginated). Emin gives 
to her mourning self the opportunity to speak back through her art, a means of 
resistance against silencing and thus a voice in relation to an experience that 
was literally unspeakable. And, while this representation of her experience 
gives Emin agency, it does not imply an unmediated outpouring of the truth. 
As Annette Kuhn (1995, 103) comments of her own working-class girlhood: 
“Though perhaps for those of us who have learnt silence through shame, the 
hardest thing of all is to fi nd a voice: not the voice of the monstrous singular 
ego but one that, summoning the resources of the place we come from, can 
speak with eloquence of, and for, that place.” Emin’s enactment of shame and 
mourning through her artwork resonates with contemporary debates about 
abortion. For feminists, visual images of conception and pregnancy have become 
a crucial site of struggle in abortion politics. The category of fetal personhood 
that emerged with fetal imaging has been contested widely by feminist critics, 
who have argued that the woman as maternal subject is always erased from such 
representations.13 Peggy Phelan’s analysis of the visibility of the fetus within New 
Right antiabortion campaigns focuses on the psychic dimensions of the debate. 
She notes the central failure of such discursive representations to represent the 
life and experiences of pregnant women, thus stressing, “the illegibility of the 
materiality of a pregnant body within a visual economy that everywhere marks 
the boundary between self and other. Embodied in and by what is and is not 
one body, the visibly pregnant woman makes the possibility of a continuous 
subject/ivity real” (1993, 171). As Phelan suggests, there is a fundamental con-
tradiction in the representation of the maternal subject as both the embodiment 
of lawful desire for reproduction within a patriarchal economy and as “the 
spectre of the monstrous, forever murdering/castrating, mother” (1993, 135). In 
Terrebly Wrong, Emin presents the monstrous spectacle of an abject maternal 
body, but in a way that insists we recognize the embodied pain of a maternal 
subject who has suffered loss through termination. She refuses to accept the 
invisibility assigned to abortion or the boundary between self and other that it 
constitutes. Emin’s repeated representations of the sight/site of loss emphasize 
both its psychic and embodied continuity, and the continuity of a relationship 
with those for whom she mourns. The sexual politics of her work involve a 
perpetual ambivalence between excess and absence in the over-presence of the 
artist in the work and in her refusal to leave the scene. Her work does not offer 
consolation or reparation for loss, but insists on its material presence traced 
through images and mementoes of her (un)maternal body.
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Monstrous Pregnancies
In the fi nal part of this essay, I offer a reading of monstrous pregnancy in the 
work of American artist Cindy Sherman and consider how she uses the gro-
tesque and comedic potential of horror to interrogate what it means to be—or 
what is meant to be—maternal. I focus on two of Sherman’s representations of 
pregnant embodiment from the series History Portraits (1988–90), and Sex Pic-
tures (1992), to suggest that she opens up a space for a different confi guration of 
the monstrous maternal. What might be seen as monstrous in her performance
of the maternal is the way in which she reworks, deforms, and confl ates signifi ers 
of sexual identity. In these photographs, the pregnant body is fi gured as both 
sexual and monstrous through prosthetic devices. Sherman’s use of phantom 
or “fake” pregnancies are one means of denaturalizing the maternal body, or as 
Donna Haraway puts it (1992, 300), “queering what counts as nature.” So, what
kinds of “queering” do such perverse representations of the pregnant body enact, 
and are these productive for rethinking the representation of maternal body?
Whereas Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills of the 1970s have been described as a
“play of simulacrums” (Bronfen 1998, 423), a signifi cant difference in her more 
recent photographs is the very obviousness of the masquerade. In Untitled #205 
(1989), from the History Portraits series, the old master nude is visibly faked: 
the face is a cosmetic mask; the prosthetic pregnant torso is hooked over her 
shoulders; and the open-weave, textured material of her drapery and the knot-
ted headdress make no attempt to simulate the lustrous silks and satins of its 
Renaissance prototype (Figure 5).14 Her slightly pursed lips and wide eyes sug-
gest both innocence and complicity with the viewer as the fi gure looks back at 
us looking at her: this is a staged encounter in which we know, as she knows, 
that we are being had. This marks a shift from the earlier “innocence” of her 
feminine fi gures subjected to the absent spectator’s gaze and forms a link with 
her later series Sex Pictures, where the viewer is caught, uncomfortably, looking.
This exchange of looks further alerts us to the representation of the fi gure’s 
sexuality. Her hands hold up the revealing material that both conceals and 
exposes her belly and gesture to the sexual zones of the body, the exaggerated 
erect red nipples and parted thighs. The purple garter worn on her upper arm 
is a fetish object, both a metonymic and a metaphoric displacement upward 
from her genitals. Sherman thus makes explicit what is implicit in her High 
Renaissance prototype, that within a masculine visual economy, female sexu-
ality is displaced onto fetishized objects, often in the form of jewels or satins. 
Sherman’s fi gure discloses in the ambiguity and duplicity of its maternal and 
sexual identity the repressed understanding that the asexual maternal is always
also the sexual feminine.
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Figure 5. Cindy Sherman,
Untitled #205, History 
Portraits (1989).
Figure 6. Cindy Sherman,
Untitled #250, Sex Pictures
(1992).
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Norman Bryson comments in relation to the History Portraits series that 
“each step in the direction of enhancing, ennobling, aestheticizing the body 
is matched somewhere else by a step toward the grotesque” (Bryson 1991, 92). 
Elisabeth Bronfen also stresses Sherman’s oscillation between what she sees as 
the two fi xed modalities of feminine self-representation within Western dis-
course: woman as fetish or simulacrum and the feminine as mutable, castrated, 
monstrous (Bronfen 1996, 1998).15 Untitled #205, History Portraits holds an 
uneasy tension between the fetishized simulacrum of a sexual feminine body 
and its threatening collapse into monstrous and castrated maternality.
In Untitled #250, Sex Pictures, this interplay of seduction and repulsion is 
intensifi ed. Sherman’s image of a pregnant and birthing body is both mon-
strously sexual and aging (Figure 6). Sherman seems closer here to Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s description of “pregnant senile hags” in Rabelais and His World (1968). 
Bakhtin argued that the material body is considered grotesque because, unlike 
the ideal body, it does not correspond to “the aesthetics of the readymade and 
completed.” On the contrary, its traditional components are “copulation, preg-
nancy, birth, growth, old age, disintegration and dismemberment . . . contrary to 
the classic image of the fi nished, completed man, cleansed . . . of all the scoriae 
of birth and development” (25). He cited as examples of “grotesque realism” 
certain terracotta fi gurines of “pregnant senile hags”: “There is nothing com-
pleted, nothing calm and stable in the bodies of these old hags. They combine 
a senile, decaying and deformed fl esh with the fl esh of new life, conceived but 
as yet unformed. Life is shown in its two-fold contradictory process; it is the 
epitome of incompleteness. And such is precisely the grotesque concept of the 
body. . . . Moreover, these old hags are laughing” (25–26). While potentially 
misogynistic, the fi gurines for Bakhtin do not evoke horror but represent a “prin-
ciple of growth” (26). As in Braidotti’s argument, they materialize “becoming,” 
a reiteration of life rather than decay (2002, 2). These aged pregnant bodies 
represent the carnivalesque “woman on top” turned critically in the form of 
laughter against official culture. The laughter of Bakhtin’s hags is subversive but, 
as Mary Russo has shown (1986, 216), such fi gures are also deeply ambivalent 
for, as she wrote, “women and their bodies, certain bodies, in certain public 
framings, in certain public spaces, are always already transgressive—dangerous
and in danger.” And, while Russo suggested that the grotesque “might be used 
affirmatively to destabilise the idealisations of female beauty or to realign the 
mechanisms of desire” (1986, 221), this is necessarily a tricky enterprise. What 
then is the effect of Sherman’s use of grotesque realism in Untitled #250? Does it 
risk reinforcing what Russo called the “connotations of fear and loathing around 
the biological processes of reproduction and of aging” (1986, 63)? Or does it 
expose a problematic representation from which women are unable to escape?
The fi gure of the “hag” is both pregnant and “senile” with a withered mask, 
thin grey hair, and prosthetic body parts. Her erect nipples are a vibrant red, as 
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is her vagina, surrounded by a mass of dark pubic hair, and she “births” a string 
of grotesque sausages between her amputated thighs.16 Unlike Bakhtin’s fi gu-
rines, Sherman’s fi gure is not laughing, but she is degraded in a very Bakhtinian 
sense: “To degrade means also to concern oneself with the lower stratum of the 
body, the life of the belly and the reproductive organs: it therefore relates to acts 
of defecation and copulation, conception, pregnancy and birth. Degradation 
digs a bodily grave for a new birth” (1968, 24). The fi gure is disturbing in its 
combination of sexuality, monstrous birth, and mortality, and for the way in 
which its aggressive stare and the phallic sausages are at odds with the seduc-
tive pose and truncated legs. It appears to be aggressive and violated, phallic 
and castrated in a way that simultaneously repulses and invites the look of the 
viewer. If Sherman’s earlier work invited a projective voyeurism or a narcissistic 
identifi cation on the part of the gendered viewer, this photograph offers a more 
complex version of embodiment.17
One difficulty of encountering Sherman’s images is that of thinking what 
category of embodied experience they belong to—just what kind of body do they 
evoke? On the one hand, the fi gures are literally “made up,” their assemblages of 
fake body parts show that there is no prediscursive body, but only an unstable 
locus of contested meaning. At the same time, she deliberately engages with the 
material specifi cities of bodies that are aging and sexually abject. What queers 
nature in Sherman’s work, I suggest, is that she pushes at this gap between 
performance and material embodiment in a way that is uncomfortable for the 
viewer to encounter. The seduction and repulsion of the “pregnant senile hag” 
not only disturbs categories of sexual and maternal identity, but Sherman’s 
confi guration of the body itself also troubles our very understanding of what 
bodies can be.18
Promising Monsters?
In this essay, I have argued that the works cited by Susan Hiller, Marc Quinn, 
Alison Lapper, Tracey Emin, and Cindy Sherman articulate bodily schema in 
ways that enable us to imagine different kinds of practices and values through 
which to fi gure maternal bodies. Susan Hiller articulates the spatiality and 
temporality of her “becoming” body as well as the split in her own subjectivity 
during pregnancy. Marc Quinn’s sculpture of Alison Lapper in late pregnancy 
and her own self-portraits invite our consideration of cultural investments 
in ideals of physical beauty and perfection, while Lapper’s photomontages 
imaginatively reconfi gure the disabled mother as “other.” Tracey Emin’s artworks 
record her experiences of unwanted pregnancy and termination through an 
aesthetic of abjection that rejects a libidinal economy. In her Sex Pictures, Cindy 
Sherman depicts the maternal body as both sexual and grotesque, deforming 
and reworking signifi ers of pregnancy and sexuality. Each artist engages with 
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bodies that are not deemed beautiful—indeed, they may be disabled, sexually 
abject, or embodied in disturbing ways. Such bodies, I suggest are “promising 
monsters,” not because they offer better aesthetic models for the maternal 
embodiment—that is not art’s function—but for the ways in which they explore
relations between culturally constructed maternal bodies and embodied and 
imagined differences. As Rosi Braidotti argues (2002, 213), “The challenge 
that the hybrid, the anomalous, the monstrous others throw in our direction 
is a disassociation from the sensibility that we inherited from the nineteenth 
century, one which pathologized and criminalized difference.” To engage with 
the anomalous and monstrously different may promise different kinds of fi gura-
tions of maternal subjects and their ways of being in the world. These do not 
offer blueprints or solutions, but they may help us understand cultural anxieties 
that surround the maternal body and offer different kinds of fi gurations that 
acknowledge the agency and potential power of the pregnant subject.
Notes
This essay is part of a chapter of my forthcoming book Maternal Embodiment in Visual
Culture, I. B. Tauris Ltd., 2007. The title is taken from Donna Haraway’s 1992 essay “The
Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for In/Appropriated Others,” in Cultural
Studies, ed. Larry Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Amy Treichler (New York: Routledge).
I should like to thank the two anonymous readers as well as my colleague Jackie Stacey
for their helpful comments on the fi nal draft.
1. Young has also described pregnancy as a “paradigm of bodily experience in
which the transparent unity of self dissolves and the body attends positively to itself at 
the same time as it enacts its projects” (1998, 274).
2. A critique of the rational and disembodied masculine subject has been central 
to feminist “body theory.” See Bordo 1993, Butler 1993, Grosz 1994, Gatens 1996, Davis 
1997, and Shildrick and Price 1998.
3. In this argument, the maternal body represents the abjected “other,” which it is 
necessary to destroy in order to restore the “clean and proper” self (Kristeva 1982, 8).
Constable 1999 and Stacey 1993 offer different readings of the monstrous maternal in 
the fi nal fi lm of the series, Alien Resurrection (1997).
4. As Davis comments (1997, 15), “recent feminist theory has displayed a marked
ambivalence towards the material body and a tendency to privilege the body as meta-
phor.” I discuss the problematic of the maternal body as both a discursive category in 
language and representation and material site of somatic and psychic attachment in
my forthcoming book.
5. For a critique of the individuated subject in connection to pregnancy and birth, 
see Battersby 1998, Boulous Walker 1998, Young 1998, Tyler 2000, and Shildrick 2002.
6. Schrader in Marland 1987, 47. For an historical analysis of maternal imagination,
see Huet 1991 and Epstein 1995.
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 7. Stacey explores the science of monsters in her book Teratologies: A Cultural Study 
of Cancer (1997), in relation both to the monstrous maternal and to tumorous cells.
 8. Lapper is an artist whose work “questions notions of physical normality and 
beauty in a society that considers her deformed because she was born without arms” 
(BritArt).
 9. At the time of this writing, the statue has not been erected. It is due in May 
2005 as part of the pedestrianization and remodeling of Trafalgar Square.
 10. See Kristeva’s writing on her own maternal experience in her essay “Stabat 
Mater” (1977/1986) and Betterton (1996) for a discussion of Kristeva and maternal 
creativity in relation to modernist artists Kathe Kollwitz and Paula Modersohn-Becker.
 11. For a discussion of the critical reception of Emin’s work, see Betterton and other
essays in Merck and Townsend 2002.
 12. Aspects of her experience of pregnancy and abortion feature repeatedly in 
Emin’s work to date, for example, the sculptural and video installations The fi rst time 
I was pregnant I started to crochet the baby a shawl (1990–2000) and Homage to Edvard 
Munch and all my Dead Children (1998), and two fi lms, How It Feels (1996) and I Don’t 
Think So (2000).
 13. On the status of fetal personhood, see Petchesky 1987, Franklin 1991, Hartouni,
1992, Stabile 1992, Duden 1993, and Phelan 1993.
 14. Sherman’s photograph is based on Raphael’s portrait of his mistress, La For-
narina, who is shown naked in a similar pose with her hands covering her breasts and 
sex. This is one of a series of pastiches of historical paintings that Sherman had studied 
at college.
 15. Sherman’s work is almost always constituted in two stages associated with the 
shift in her work from pastiche to abjection. Notable critical readings of her work are 
those by Krauss 1993, Phelan 1993, Mulvey 1996, and Bronfen 1996; 1998.
 16. The string of sausages recalls the carnivalesque and phallic fi gure of Punch, 
whose humor is also grotesque and sexually aggressive.
 17. Despite the claims and counterclaims for reading Sherman’s work within a femi-
nist politics of the body by Mulvey 1991, Krauss 1993, and Jones 1997, this framework 
seems to be inadequate to address the specifi c transgressions of her later work.
 18. My thanks to one of the readers of the fi nal draft for making this valuable point 
although there is not scope to develop it within this paper.
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